The recent political turmoil challenges one to study the function and form of the post-war Japanese political parties. The obvious differences in the spatial and temporal contexts do not change the fact that many of the organizational behavioral patterns that are topical in the analysis of the current situation can be found in the parties that were established during the erratic years following Japan's defeat. With a focus on intra-party relations and on the multilayered institutional environment in which the political parties operate, this article focuses on Hokkaido, a region which analysts of Japanese political parties have often ignored. While demonstrating (a) the interconnectedness of different spheres in the political system, (b) the varying roles of central party organs in the development of local party branches, and (c) the personal relations prevailing over the official organizational channels, the analysis of the control and granting of autonomy pays special attention to the first gubernatorial elections in Hokkaido. This is because the electoral competitions and the creation of electoral products are recognized as moments when the relations between local branches and central leadership are defined.
Introduction
Studies concentrating on intra-party organizational dynamics within Japanese political parties are topical. This is due to the observable change in the realm of politics -especially the rise of the so-called "third force" parties around the 2012 House of Representatives election -and because of the recent theoretical discussion concerning the functioning of political parties. The Osaka Restoration Association (Osaka Ishin no Kai) and its metamorphosis into the Japan Restoration Party (JRP, Nihon Ishin no Kai) at least temporarily served as an alternative model of party organization, that is, a regional party successfully expanding into national politics. Meanwhile, contemporary critics have proposed that the ways in which political parties operate and the environment in which they operate have not been understood properly.
The increased volatility within the current party system motivates one to ask how much we know about the past of Japanese political parties vis-à-vis the relations between party headquarters and local party branches. Even a cursory literature review reveals a comprehensive array of studies which explain (a) the factional nature of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP, Jiyū Minshutō), (b) the role of personal support groups (kōenkai) which have substituted for strong local party organizations, and (c) the "keiretsu relations" between Diet members and local politicians (Uekami 2008; Krauss and Pekkanen 2011; Tsuruya 2012; Winkler 2012) . However, our knowledge concerning the political parties that existed before a long-lasting status quo was achieved in 1955 through the mergers of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP, Nihon Shakaitō) and the LDP is slim.
Starting with these premises, this study has two interconnected objectives. It strives for a new understanding of post-war intra-party organizational dynamics and introduces the development of the pre-1955 parties through the case study of the peripheral region of Hokkaido, a region which analysts of Japanese political parties have often ignored. The models of delegation and franchise are utilized as analytical tools for characterizing and categorizing different parties vis-à-vis the level of autonomy and control. The former refers to a top-down model where the national party leadership is principal and local units are nominally "delegated" the discretion to act at the local level. The latter does not assume that ultimate power lies in any branch of the party organization, but that different parts of the organization join together on an equal footing for mutual benefit (Hijino 2014) .
The focus on Hokkaido is based on the following rationale: The amount and type of authority delegated to the regional branches can be expected to vary with the need for regionally specific information, expertise, or credibility. This need is likely to be highest in regions that are distinct from the rest of the state. For example, the distinctive regions of Catalonia, the Basque Country, Corsica, Scotland, and Northern Italy are also regarded as the most interesting case studies for this phenomenon (Van Houten 2009: 141) . The claim on Hokkaido's unconventionality as a location for party political competition is based on the JSP's exceptionally good results in the Diet and gubernatorial elections, which were followed by the success of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ, Nihon Minshutō) . In other words, Hokkaido went against the belief that anti-LDP voting is particularly prominent in urban areas and that the governing party is stronger in rural areas, which are more dependent on central governmental support (Scheiner 2006: 116-117) . Furthermore, while the combined percentage of votes secured by the LDP and the JSP since the 1958 House of Representatives election has been even greater in Hokkaido than the nationwide average (Hasuike 1997: 83-84) , the political parties that were built around the farmers' movement and the strong cooperative tradition in Hokkaido successfully challenged the mainstream parties during the first post-war decade.
Intra-party relationships and the multilayered institutional environment
Theoretical literature alleges that the traditional models of political parties fail to recognize the nature of the relationship between various organizational units within the parties. It has also been argued that the language used to describe and analyze the behavior of political parties often fails to recognize that (a) political parties function in a multilayered institutional environment, and (b) the environment affects the way in which they are organized and behave (Deschouwer 2003: 213-214; Carty 2004: 6-7; Deschouwer 2006: 292) . In other words, the degree of autonomy that units within the parties have may vary, and differences in the relationship between the party's central organization and its local franchises are possible. In addition, different spheres in a multidimensional political system are connected and things happening at one level or in one region can affect the political life of the others (Deschouwer 2003: 222) .
There are several possible benefits for a party in allowing some form of autonomy in a local party branch. The regional branch may be more effective in mobilizing voters and conveying the party's message, and it may have more credibility with the electorate in the region. Yet when a party gives freedoms to its local branches in order to gain the benefits of specialization, it also opens the door to an increase in uncontrolled actions that may hurt the party as a whole. Therefore, the party leadership conducts a continuous balancing act between control of the branches and the delegation of authority and autonomy for the sake of benefits obtained. Electoral competitions and the creation of electoral products (i.e., candidates and policy) in particular are moments when the relations between local branches and central leadership are defined and re-defined (Carty 2004: 11-13; Van Houten 2009: 141-143) . This article analyses these crucial moments through the first three popular elections for the Hokkaido governorship. This approach borrows from the argument of Hijino (2014) , which states that in order to understand the organization of Japanese parties, one has to pay attention to how the national party leadership chooses to control or delegate tasks related to the election of directly elected governors and mayors.
The variety of methods and mechanisms of control is significant, ranging from the selection and screening of agents to different types of contracts and sanctions. This means that -secretly or openly -the central party leadership can influence the selection of regional leaders and the candidate selection process. Furthermore, the use of contracts, from formal party rules to informal conventions as well as the idea of party discipline, is a way to control the local agent. Control of party finances is another type of contract that is also closely connected to the party leaders' ability to punish (or reward) regional branches. Thus, the use of sanctions is a nuanced process that is not limited to the ability to expel an actor from the party (Van Houten 2009: 145-147) .
Hokkaido branches and party headquarters
The following historical narrative describing the relationships between Hokkaido branches and central party organs is divided into two parts. The first introduces the evolution of political parties in Hokkaido prior to the 1955 mergers (leading to the creation of the LDP and JSP) and pays attention to the role of party leadership in the establishment and development of local chapters. The second part concentrates on the gubernatorial elections as cases that allow for a more detailed analysis of control and delegation of autonomy.
Hokkaido in the periphery and center of party organizations

Establishment and early development of the local party branches
The months following Japan's surrender saw the rapid emergence of various political parties, which filled the vacuum caused by the dissolution of the already disconnected and weak pre-war political parties in the summer of 1940 and the demolition of Japan's wartime political control organizations. The Progressive Party (Nihon Shinpotō), the Liberal Party (Nihon Jiyūtō), the Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaitō), and the Communist Party (Nihon Kyōsantō) were the most important new parties established during the autumn of 1945. Despite their names, the first two were conservative by nature and consisted of elements derived from the pre-war Rikken Seiyūkai [Friends of the Constitutional Government] and Rikken Minseitō [Constitutional Democratic Party] (Masumi 1985; Tominomori 2006) .
There is no evidence that Hokkaido played a major role in the founding of the Progressive Party, although many of the wartime Hokkaido Diet members joined its ranks. The party that was by far the largest among the newly established groups was formed by those Diet members who had been elected in the 1942 election with the blessing of the wartime cabinet and at the recommendation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Structure Association (Yokusan Seiji Taisei Kyōgikai) (Shillony 1981: 19-22) . Therefore, the execution of the 4 January 1946 purge directives was a devastating shock to the party, which had only three candidates in Hokkaidoall of whom failed to win election -in the first post-war House of Representatives election in April 1946. The leadership of its Hokkaido branch was passed to Arima Eiji, who had been elected as an independent candidate (Okuda 1956: 97, 135; Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai 1998: 150) . The modest success of the Progressive Party seems to go hand-in-hand with Babb's (2002) distinction of different types of conservatism in the immediate post-war era in Japan, suggesting that the party polled well in industrial and urbanized areas but yielded to the liberals -focused on defending the status quo of rural landlords -in rural areas. sentatives: 1946 (464), 1947-1953 (466), 1955 onward (467) . Sources: http://go2senkyo.com/; Ishikawa and Yamaguchi (2010) .
The early development of the Liberal Party was connected to Hokkaido through Hiratsuka Tsunejirō. Hiratsuka was a businessman and a behind-the-scenes political influencer who had helped establish the Liberal Party. At the same 1965: 197-198, 213; Masuda 1998: 164; Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai 1998: 141; Masuda 2001: 105) . While Hatoyama's unsuccessful attempt to recruit an influential local figure to run as a candidate in Muroran at the beginning of the occupation indicates the party headquarters' interest in Hokkaido (Sano 2009: 89-91) , no evidence has been found that the recommendation letters and money provided by Tsuji Karoku -an important behind-the-scenes supporter of Hatoyama and Kōno -affected the nomination of candidates in Hokkaido, as it did in Tottori, for example (Nagayama 1991: 54-55) .
The post-defeat political confusion manifested itself in the establishment of numerous small parties and in the great number of independent candidates who ran in the first post-war election. In Hokkaido, the Hokkaido Political League (Hokkaidō Seiji Dōmei) was a local conservative group established at the beginning of January 1946, a league which, alongside holding half of the Hokkaido Assembly seats, got three of its candidates elected in the April 1946 election. The central figure and sponsor of the party was Chizaki Usaburō, who together with the other two successful candidates joined the ranks of the Progressive Party soon after their election to the Diet. The defections at the national level also led to the disintegration of the Political League at the regional level. A year later, Chizaki acted as one of the architects behind the establishment of the Democratic Party (Nihon Minshutō) as an amalgamation of the Progressive Party, the Ashida Hitoshi group from the Liberal Party, and members of smaller parties. While Chizaki served as the secretary general of the party before being purged in April 1947, Shiikuma Saburō, another old Seiji Dōmei Diet member, took the lead in the party's Hokkaido branch (Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei 1957: 49-50; Chizaki Usaburō Kinen 1984: 215, 228; Asahi Shinbun Seitō Kishadan 1998: 165) .
It can thus be concluded that immediately after their establishment, the ties between the Hokkaido branches of the conservative parties and the central party leadership were relatively weak and based on personal relations rather than on formalized organizational channels. At the same time, the lack of local actors was a typical feature of both major conservative parties. The composition of the Hokkaido Prefectural Assembly remained unchanged after the 1940 election, and only five of the incumbent 56 assembly members were affiliated with the Liberal Party in the spring of 1946. The Progressives had only one seat in the Assembly. The first Hokkaido Prefectural Assembly election in April 1947 demonstrated only a slight increase in the popularity of candidates affiliated with these parties (Okuda 1956: 49, 118, 205) .
The weakness of the local party chapters was not limited to Hokkaido. On the contrary, when the occupation authorities evaluated the Liberal and the Progressive Parties in the summer and autumn of 1946, they acknowledged the centralized party organization, local branches' lack of freedoms and influence, and the all-powerful position of party leaders (Saunavaara 2010: 233-240) . It is, however, important to emphasize that the lack of official party membership did not automatically rule out the possible cooperation between a member of the Hokkaido Assembly and some national political party or its representative in the Diet. In other words, it is not only party affiliation but also unofficial personal relations that connect local-and national-level politicians with each other (Scheiner 2006: 127-130; Uekami 2008: 58-61, 69) .
Although the pre-war Hokkaido electorate had voted for the mainstream conservative parties (Shimizu et al. 1996: 92-96) , the rapid start of the left-wing parties in Hokkaido was due to the existence of proletarian movement activists whose personal networks reached beyond the borders of the island. The first preparatory meeting to organize the Socialist Party's Hokkaido chapter was opened in Sapporo on 8 October 1946, and the formation was finalized on 5 December 1946. A month earlier, the Hokkaido socialists had sent a delegation to the party's inauguration meeting (Okuda 1956: 99-100; Takahashi 1982: 41-47; Hasuike 1997: 85) . The formation process in Hokkaido resembled the simultaneous development in Hyōgo Prefecture, where many pre-war proletarian parties and movements had been popular, although the connection between Hyogo-based actors and the Socialist Party headquarters seems to have been stronger than it had been in Hokkaido (Fukunaga 1982a (Fukunaga , 1982b . In the case of the Communist Party, the central party organization supported the local actors and the party leaders were present when the post-war party organization in Hokkaido was launched in December 1945. The early efforts of the Hokkaido communists culminated in the April 1946 election, in which they secured a seat in the Diet. While the party's activities also gained visibility later, the electoral success of the communists remained modest in general (Okuda 1956: 99-100, 107-109; Takahashi 1982: 41) .
The early post-war years turned out to be a period of organizational flux for agricultural and cooperative organizations incorporating a strong tradition of supervision by agricultural administration and of association with the conservative parties. Nevertheless, their pre-war political power in Hokkaido did not disappear, and political parties were soon established to represent the cooperative movement and agricultural interests.1 Many of the leaders of the new parties had their background in those pre-war organizations that had been utilized to direct rural votes and which could even be considered substitutes for local party organizations (Mulgan 2000: 39-43; Babb 2005: 177-179, 186-187) .
The Japan Cooperative Party (Nihon Kyōdōtō) was a nationwide party, but many of its founding fathers came from Hokkaido. It was established on 18 December 1945, with the aim of bringing together groups unified by the cooperative principle and practices. The spokesmen of the party insisted that the idea of founding a new party did not originate from members of the Diet, but rather the organization came about because of an appeal from the local prefectural level committees, one of which was naturally active in Hokkaido.2 Soon after its establishment, the party lost almost all of its leaders in the purge and remained far behind the liberals, progressives, and socialists in the national results of the April 1946 election (Saunavaara 2010: 163, 204) . Nevertheless, the Cooperative Party was the most popular party in Hokkaido.
The party's standing in Hokkaido soon changed as it amalgamated with smaller groups, and new influential characters with nationwide recognition were persuaded to join the Cooperative Democratic Party (Kyōdō Minshutō), formed in May 1946 (Fukunaga 1997: 81-82) . When the new party began to diverge from the cooperative theory and tried to broaden its support base to urban areas, it ran into internal problems. Because of party infighting, Kita Katsutarō, a member of the Lower House elected from Hokkaido and a founding father of the party's Hokkaido branch, was expelled from the party together with his brother. Soon after, the Kita brothers formed the second Japan Cooperative Party (Nihon Kyōdōtō) in cooperation with the third Hokkaido-based Diet member (Okuda 1956: 100-101; Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei 1957: 49; Mulgan 2000: 177) .
The process described above seems to reflect the juxtaposition within the party between Hokkaido and the rest of Japan. However, if the history of the Hokkaido Farmers' League (Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei), the important votegathering organization behind the various Hokkaido-based Farmers' Parties, is to be believed, the Farmers' Party movement carried another type of juxtaposition within it from the very beginning: The party, born as an outcome of political struggle in Tokyo, managed to win the support of the Sorachi and Tokachi Agricultural Associations, which had already advanced with their own party plans in Asahikawa. The party reorganized itself as the Japan Farmers' Party (Nihon Nōmintō), and politicians with experience of national politics subjugated a locally born political movement with a totally different, more socialist character in line with their own preferences (Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei 1957: 44-49, 53) . This narrative has to be understood in the context of a time when the Farmers' League supported socialists, but it may explain the later close relations between the Nōmin Dōmei and the Socialist Party.
Tumultuous transition toward the 1955 regime
As Table 1 shows, the conservative regional branches in Hokkaido adapted to changes occurring at the national level after the immediate formation period. The liberals' Hokkaido branch suffered in the purge of Hiratsuka in the spring of 1947, but enjoyed a great victory in the January 1949 House of Representatives election under the banner of the Democratic Liberal Party (Minshu Jiyūtō), which was born in the center as an amalgamation of liberals and a group disengaging itself from the Democratic Party. The progressive votes were mainly channeled into the Socialist Party. But while the Socialist Party won the greatest number of seats among all political groups in the April 1947 Hokkaido Assembly election (Hokkaidō Gikai 1977: 202) and the House of Representatives election, it crashed in the 1949 election. The party lost a majority of its nationwide seats in the election that followed the middle-of-the-road cabinets of Katayama and Ashida Hitoshi, and could not hold on to any of its incumbent seats in Hokkaido. However, the socialists -the left-wing of the disintegrated party in particular -recovered rapidly at the beginning of the new decade.
While the Japan Farmers' Party polled well in Hokkaido despite the purge of many of its leaders, the Cooperative Democratic Party, which had amalgamated with the People's Party (Kokumintō), lost ground in the northernmost prefecture. However, the local assembly groups of the new People's Cooperative Party (Kokumin Kyōdōtō) and the Farmers' Party merged in April 1948 (Hokkaidō Gikai 1977: 202, 268) , leading to the establishment of the New Farmers' Party (Nōmin Shintō) in December 1948 through a partial merger of the same parties. Although the new party, which had been established with the aim of achieving nationwide success, performed well in Hokkaido in the 1949 Lower House election, it failed to win any seats in the rest of Japan. And even though two Diet members from Fukuoka joined the party after the election, it did not solve the basic dilemma, The re-naming process was connected to the struggle for a larger support base and revealed differences inside the party. Although the more conservative Diet members' faction was eager to remove characters referring to farmers from the name of the party in order to attract nationwide interest from different social classes, the Hokkaido Farmers' League pressured them into accepting a name that would not sever the links between the party and its rural supporters in Hokkaido. The re-named party secured the greatest number of Hokkaido seats among all political groups in the 1950 Upper House election, but was unable to win seats elsewhere (Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei 1957: 139-140, 152; Mulgan 2000: 179-181) .
During the political turmoil of the first half of the 1950s, the voting behavior and structural realignment of the Hokkaido conservatives continued to reflect national trends. When the Liberal Party split into the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions, the Yoshida faction won all but one of the party's seats despite the early connection between Hokkaido liberals and politicians close to Hatoyama. However, in 1955, conservative voters voted mainly for the Democratic Party (Nihon Minshutō) (Ito 1992: 104-105; Tsutsui 1992: 119-121, 127, 130) . Meanwhile, the Hokkaido branch of the Socialist Party attempted to distance itself from the serious internal friction at the national level and eventually was the last part of the party to split. In the spring of 1950, the party was divided for 75 days, but reunified following calls for unity from the local branches and supporting labor organizations. However, after the party's second rupture from October 1951 on, which penetrated down to the local branches and labor union movement, leading Hokkaido socialists were among the first to build bridges between the competing left-and right-wing socialists at the national level (Okuda 1956: 269; Fukunaga 1982b; Takahashi 1983: 135-139) .
The final collapse of the Farmers' Cooperative Party in 1952 was preceded by challenges in both the local and central political sphere. Whereas a link between the disintegration of the party and changes in the political center -that is, the establishment of the Reform Party (Kaishintō) -existed, it was mainly connected with disorder among the ranks of the Nōmin Dōmei prior to the 1951 Hokkaido governor's election. Thereafter, the former Diet members of the party who had switched to the Reform Party performed poorly in the 1952 House of Representatives election, and the remaining members of the Hokkaido Assembly changed the name of their group under the auspices of the Nōmin Dōmei. The majority of the former supporters of the various Farmers' Parties found their way into the ranks of the Socialist Party (Okuda 1956: 291-294, 303-305; Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei 1957: 157-159) .
The turbulence in the political party field was settled at the end of 1955 when the establishment of the LDP succeeded the unification of the right-and left-wing socialists. The local actors reacted rapidly to the change in the center and the JSP Hokkaido branch was among the first local units to amalgamate. The formation of the LDP Hokkaido chapter had already been preceded by the unification of conservative groups in the Hokkaido Assembly in August 1955. The leadership was in the hands of local political actors, but the branch was still dependent on funding provided by the Diet members (Fujino and Asada 1982: 88-91 ). The two catch-all parties split the Diet seats of Hokkaido into almost equal shares, leaving very little or nothing for other parties in the following elections. The exceptionally good election results of the Socialist Party were not, however, a direct indication of the party's organizational strength or political leadership. On the contrary, as Nagai and Okaji (1962: 221) have shown, the number of registered party members remained low in Hokkaido even after the party re-unified, and many of the Socialist Party members identified primarily with the labor union with which they were affiliated. The labor unions initiated policies that were later accepted by the party branch, which was far from being able to operate with the money it collected from its local members.
Intra-party relations and the creation of the electoral product in gubernatorial elections
The months following the defeat saw a parade of short-term nominated office holders, but the office of the Hokkaido Governor remained a conservative citadel until a system of popularly elected governors was introduced (Hokkaidō Gikai 1977: 19-23) . The two main conservative candidates for governorship in April 1947 were first-term members of the House of Representatives: Tomabechi Hidetoshi, supported by the Liberal Party, and Arima Eiji, who was backed by the Democratic Party. The Cooperative Democratic Party had already elected their official candidate, but after the party merger the People's Cooperative Party decided to back Tomabechi. The Farmers' Party supported an independent candidate.3 The Socialist Party headquarters accepted Professor Minami Ryōsaburō as the party's candidate for governor on 12 March 1947. However, this situation changed when the leaders of the Hokkaido Government Workers' Union proposed another candidate, Tanaka Toshifumi, a young and unknown chairman of the Workers' Union and the Chief of the Forest and Public Works Section in the Hokkaido Prefectural Government. Eventually, the leaders of the Socialist Party withdrew their earlier decision and decided to support Tanaka, who joined the party (Arima and Ono 1961: 165; Takahashi 1982: 101, 108) .
Tanaka won the first round, but his situation in the decisive vote against Arima was challenging as the conservatives could concentrate support on one candidate. Despite this, Tanaka won re-election on April 16 with the strong backing of labor unionists and with the rural votes of the Farmers' Party. Besides representing the relative strength of various political parties, the election result also reflected peculiar political conditions and networks in Hokkaido. As has been argued by Ogawa and Araki (1971: 171-172) and Takahashi (1982: 110-117) , much needed funds for the socialist candidate were received from the supporter of Chizaki Usaburō. Interestingly, Arima also argues that Chizaki and Shiikuma, two Diet members from his own party, at first refused the liberals proposal concerning the conservatives' unified support for Tomabechi but then did not lend him their support during the election (Arima and Ono 1961: 164-167) .
The outcome of the Hokkaido election was exceptional. The Socialist Party won the race for the governorship in only four prefectures nationwide. It seems, however, that Tanaka's success was not based on the strength of the party itself or its strong commitment to strive for electoral success in Hokkaido. Instead, the party headquarters' support for the establishment of the Hokkaido branch, and its aid for the Hokkaido-based candidates in the Diet election, was at best moderate (Takahashi 1982 (Takahashi : 121, 1983 . The surprising result was a testament to the ability to adapt to prevailing conditions. While the locally strong labor unions and the Farmers' Party secured Tanaka's victory, the support of the People's Cooperative Party, which had reasonable representation in the Diet, did not help the conservatives. The confusion inside the party's Hokkaido branch peaked in the second round of the election when it withdrew support from the conservatives and decided not to recommend either candidate (Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei 1957: 52) .
While in 1947 the conservative parties' nomination of candidates, failed attempts at cooperation, and campaigns, were planned and executed by the Hokkaido branch offices and local politicians, the April 1951 election clearly demonstrates a change in the approach of party headquarters. Besides having learned a lesson concerning the importance of rural voters, the nomination process and campaigning showed a new readiness by party headquarters to play a role in and even to dominate their local chapters. The 1951 elections turned out to be a case in point when the party headquarters parachuted a candidate into the locality. What made this process unusual was the fact that the leaders of the Liberal Party parachuted in a non-party affiliated candidate, while the local branch wanted to vote for a party candidate. More recent examples point in the opposite direction -that is, local actors' occasional inclination to go against the candidate imposed by the central leadership and vote for the candidate of another party (Hijino 2014) .
The political scene in Hokkaido changed drastically after the depurge of midOctober 1950, as many of the most notable political figures could now re-enter the political world. Before the depurge issue became topical, the Liberal Party was campaigning on behalf of Okada Kaneyoshi, the former governor and assistant director of the Hokkaido Development Agency. Okada visited Hokkaido twice during the second half of 1950 and continued the Liberals' earlier attempt to attract the Hokkaido farming population. Another former governor, Masuda Kaneshichi, Minister of Construction and the Director of the Development Agency, promoted Okada by first denying funding from Governor Tanaka's dam project in Hokkaido and then approving it as a fund assured through the efforts of Okada.4
The change in the big picture meant, however, that Okada was discarded. The Liberal Party headquarters in Tokyo did not believe in Okada's chances against Tanaka, and Hirokawa Kōzen, the Liberal Party Secretary General and later Minister of Agriculture, introduced the depurged Kuroasawa Torizō, a pioneer of the Hokkaido dairy industry and one of the original founders of the Cooperative Party, to other party leaders. After the decision to back Kurosawa was made, the Hokkaido chapter was pressured to support Kurosawa, who was also backed by the Farmers' Cooperative Party and the People's Democratic Party (Kokumin Minshutō), as well as influential individuals like Chizaki.5
In short, Yoshida Shigeru and other party leaders supported a prestigious, non-party affiliated person from Hokkaido, who spent weeks on a study tour around Europe in the spring of 1951 and dispatched spokespersons to represent himself at various speech events around Hokkaido. Meanwhile, the local branch and the Diet members elected from Hokkaido spoke, unsuccessfully, on behalf of a candidate whose life and career had only briefly touched Hokkaido, but who was clearly a party candidate committed to running for office. When Kurosawa was abroad, the leaders of the parties that were backing him planned his campaign. Furthermore, Masuda and Hirokawa came to Hokkaido to support Kurosawa at the end of the campaign. Masuda openly argued that Tokyo's political leaders supported Kurosawa, who could secure the funding for and execution of the comprehensive development of Hokkaido. Tanaka was described as a candidate who was longing for the overthrowing of the Yoshida Cabinet and could do nothing to advance or secure the comprehensive development of Hokkaido (Okuda 1956: 288; Takahashi 1982 Takahashi : 327-332, 336-339, 1983 . While this kind of interference on the part of members of the Cabinet may look exceptional, it is worth noting that the following decades saw similar kinds of warnings against the selection of non-LDP governors in other prefectures (Scheiner 2006: 111) .
During his first term, Tanaka had created good working relations with the Hokkaido Assembly members of the Farmers' Cooperative Party and the Democratic Party. Kurosawa's emergence as a candidate meant that Tanaka lost the assumed backing of the Farmers' Cooperative Party. However, the Hokkaido Farmers' League was split between the candidates. In particular, some of the youth groups within the League decided to support Tanaka even in regions that were considered Kurosawa strongholds.6 In addition, two Democratic Party candidates who were running in the 1951 Hokkaido Assembly elections openly supported Tanaka's governorship (Okuda 1956: 266) . While this may look like an odd mismatch, this kind of behavior is not rare in Japanese politics. More recent observations show that in order to secure policy access and influence after the local chief executive election, local legislators may choose to support a strong candidate representing another party rather than fight for the candidate of their own party and fall into opposition (Hijino 2014) . The socialists also managed to bring the Hokkaido labor unions together in November 1950 when the All Hokkaido Council of Labour Unions (Zendōrōkyō) was established to support Tanaka's campaign and to muster, successfully, the progressive elements of the Nōmin Dōmei.7
After all this maneuvering, Tanaka Toshifumi won the gubernatorial election and the Socialist Party secured the greatest number of seats among all parties in the Hokkaido Assembly. Nevertheless, the interconnectedness of different spheres in multidimensional political systems soon became apparent. The conservatives, who lost in the Hokkaido polls, bounced back with a victory in Tokyo. Only weeks after the election, the Yoshida Cabinet decided to amend the Hokkaido Development Law and establish the Hokkaido Development Bureau. Through this process, various Hokkaido administrations were incorporated under the direct jurisdiction of the central government (Fujino and Asada 1982: 88-91; Saunavaara 2014: 149) . The left-wing parties and the labor union front opposed this change, which was actively promoted by the Liberal Party.8 It should be noted, however, that this was yet another initiative that originated in the Liberal Party headquarters and was afterwards introduced to the representatives of the Hokkaido branch (Okuda 1956: 297-298) .
Four years later in 1955, the Nōmin Dōmei successfully supported Tanaka's re-election against a conservative candidate who, despite the recommendations of two major conservative parties, could not even secure the united support of the more conservatively inclined farmers' organizations. It is noteworthy that, also in 1955, it was the Tokyo-based party leadership who mobilized the movement behind the conservative candidate for the Hokkaido governorship at least partially against the will of local party activists (Takahashi 1983: 222-225, 232) .
Conclusions
This study strengthens the perception that local party organizations at the beginning of the post-war period were weak. The socialists and especially the successive farmers' parties polled well in Hokkaido, but their success was not based on strong local party organizations. On the contrary, their victories rested on the support of interest groups, which eventually secured the post-1955 success of the JSP. Theoretical literature suggests that it is often difficult to distinguish between a regional branch that has autonomy because the national party allows it, and a regional branch that has autonomy because the national party no longer controls it (Van Houten 2009: 148) . The case of Hokkaido supports this conclusion. The autonomous position of Governor Tanaka (who resigned from the Socialist Party in 1953 to protest against the party split [see Fujino and Asada 1982: 56-59] ) and the position of the Hokkaido socialists (in relation to the party leadership in Tokyo) could be seen as either a sign of trust in local actors or a conscious and calculated decision to delegate responsibilities to the representatives of the distinctive region as a trade-off to benefit from the local expertise. However, these two examples were more likely a sign of weakness in a party that was suffering from serious internal friction at the national level.
The lack of organizational strength and stability also restricted the ways in which the local branches were controlled. The party headquarters were incapable of employing many of the control mechanisms associated with modern political parties. The central leadership occasionally intervened in the selection of agents, but no cases have been found where a punitive or controlling act was carried out in the name of party rules or other type of formal contract. The control of local chapters through the distribution of party finances remained rather insignificant. Payments from the Diet members were important, but the necessary funds for campaigning were often gathered from external sources outside the party organization. While the expulsion of the Kita brothers from the Cooperative Democratic Party may appear to be an example of sanctions against individuals or branches, it was a matter of fighting in the center, not an act aimed at the local party chapter.
Hijino (2014), who evaluates the LDP and the DPJ through the models of "delegation" and "franchise," concluded that, in the case of the LDP, the discretion given to local branches appears to be one of looser franchise, whereas for the DPJ it appears to be one of failed delegation. If this vocabulary is used to illustrate the situation in immediate post-war Hokkaido, the Socialist Party can be described as a "loose franchise," whereas the conservative parties followed the delegation model at least in two out of the three gubernatorial elections discussed above. When introducing the behavior of the LDP and the DPJ in recent gubernatorial elections, Hijino points out that attempts at top-down imposition of candidates often trigger resistance from local organizations whose incentives may differ from those of the central party organs. Although the actors and the surrounding conditions are different in several respects, in general the choices of the party leadership in the immediate post-war years were remarkably similar to those of the LDP and the DPJ. In the case of Hokkaido, the choices made by the conservatives prior to 1955 failed miserably and were not repeated during the subsequent decades of LDP domination.
Placed within the context of the wider post-war history, however, the observations made about the case of Hokkaido let us infer different conclusions: The LDP has been more active than the JSP in participating in the election of prefectural governors through the nomination of candidates running with the blessing of the party headquarters. Yet the LDP candidate selection for local elections has been described as being conducted "bottom-up" from lower to higher tiers of the party organization. Thus, the pattern of agreement between the party center and local branches resulted in the relatively conflict-free selections of gubernatorial candidates from the 1960s to the 1990s for the LDP (Tsuji 2010: 46; Hijino 2014: 82) . Although no direct link between the conservatives' failed intervention in Hokkaido and the pattern of behavior within the LDP can be drawn, the early post-war examples at least demonstrate the existence of an alternative modus operandi that was avoided in the following decades. Furthermore, while the history of the Hokkaido-based Farmers' Parties offers only limited means for further analysis of the rise and fall of the Japan Restoration Party (JRP, Nippon Ishi no Kai), many resemblances can be observed (for an analysis concerning the JRP, see Reed 2013) . It can be concluded that the difficulties the JRP faced in the consolidation of a regional support base with attempts to scrape together nationwide support, and the problems in holding on to the political identity and original policy proposals despite amalgamations with other political groups, were not without precedent in the history of Japanese political parties.
